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What’s Left of the Political Constitution? 
 
By Adam Tomkins* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper argues that we should move on from what has become a rather outdated 
contrast between the political constitution and the legal constitution. Taking as its focus 
the constitution of the United Kingdom, the paper analyzes the contemporary 
constitutional order as a mixed system of politics and law combined. It argues that such a 
mix may be a more compelling and attractive system than either the model of the political 
constitution or that of the legal constitution.  
 
 
 
A. Introduction
1
 
 
The model of the political constitution has frequently been contrasted with that of the 
legal constitution. In drawing this contrast, the relationship between the political 
constitution and the legal constitution has typically been presented as one of rivalry.
2
 On 
this view, these are competing models, generally at odds with one another, doing battle 
not just for primacy but, it seems, for exclusivity. As such, the constitution of the United 
Kingdom is seen either as a political constitution or as a legal constitution; we may depict 
the British constitution from either the perspective of a political constitutionalist, or from 
that of a legal constitutionalist. More recently, several commentators have argued that this 
distinction is a false choice and that we can, and indeed in the UK do, have elements of 
both.
3
 On this revised view, the British constitution is neither exclusively political nor 
                                            
* John Millar Professor of Public Law, University of Glasgow, adam.tomkins@glasgow.ac.uk.  
1 This is an essay on the constitution and public law of the United Kingdom; it is not an exercise in transcendental 
constitutionalism or in global constitutional theory. The British debate between political and legal 
constitutionalists is primarily concerned with how—and by whom—executive powers are best held to account. Its 
main focus is not on arguments about the extent to which primary legislation should be subject to judicial review. 
2 See ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 1–24 (2003); ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 1–25 (2005).  
3 See Tom R. Hickman, In Defence of the Legal Constitution, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 981 (2005); Graham Gee & Grégoire 
C.N. Webber, What Is a Political Constitution?, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 273 (2010). 
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exclusively legal. The revised view is correct. The British constitution is indeed now a 
“mixed constitution.”
4
 
 
Several things follow. The first is that, if we are to understand the contemporary British 
constitution, we must understand both its political and its legal dimensions. Any account of 
the constitution that presented only one of these aspects would necessarily fail. Any British 
constitutional lawyer who thinks that case law is the only primary source worthy of 
consideration does not understand the constitution and can give nothing but a misleading 
account of it. (Of course, any British constitutional commentator who overlooks case law in 
her account of the constitution must also fail.) Parliamentary sources remain essential. I do 
not mean only legislation, but also parliamentary debates and the proceedings and reports 
of select committees. Executive sources, from the Ministerial Code to the Cabinet Manual 
(both of which include de facto codifications of constitutional convention, among other 
things) are likewise indispensible. 
 
But there is much more at stake here than a squabble over appropriate sources. To say 
that the British—or, for that matter, any other—constitution is a mixed constitution, that 
brings together and relies on elements of both politics and of law, does not take us very 
far. As Sedley L.J. said in another context, to say that something is sui generis does not tell 
us anything about the content or the nature of the genus we have identified.
5
 It matters 
less that the constitution is mixed than what the balance of the mix is, and should be. Are 
we talking about a largely political constitution with a smaller legal element, or is it the 
other way round? Or, are the two more or less equal partners? Are they partners at all? 
Are we talking about a happy mix with a nice balance, a good mix, a coherent mix; or a riot, 
a mess, a muddle, a dysfunctional, conflicted, fragile, uncertain, mixed-up constitution? 
Does the mix combine to make the constitution stronger than the sum of its parts? Or do 
we have a combustible mix that is inherently unstable? Finally, do we have a mix that is a 
hopelessly unprincipled compromise, or are there such things as principles of mixed 
constitutionalism that can be distilled from a normative analysis of British constitutional 
practice?  
 
I was more worried a few years ago about these matters than I am now. I was concerned 
that we had so under-valued Parliament as an institution in which the Government of the 
day could be held effectively to constitutional account that there were many who had 
given up on it.
6
 I was likewise concerned that the only institution showing much 
                                            
4 The “mixed constitution” is an old phrase, and I do not mean to use it in the way in which it was understood in 
the eighteenth century. For example, I am not referring to that ancient mix of monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy that Blackstone, par excellence, identified as animating the Anglo-British constitution. I am referring to 
the contemporary mix of politics and law.  
5 See Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Pankina, *2010+ EWCA (Civ) 719, [2011] Q.B. 376 (Eng.).  
6 See Adam Tomkins, What is Parliament For?, in PUBLIC LAW IN A MULTI-LAYERED CONSTITUTION 53 (Nicholas Bamforth 
& Peter Leyland eds., 2003).  
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constitutional initiative was the judiciary: that the judges were on the march, that the 
constitution was up for grabs, and that it was the judges who were grabbing it.
7
 Recent 
years have witnessed, however, something of a parliamentary comeback and, more 
clearly, a halting of the judicial advance. Indeed, some interventions have even suggested 
that it would be appropriate now to see something of a judicial retreat.
8
 These 
developments merit closer examination.  
 
In relation to Parliament, while the public and media perception of parliamentary values 
took a deserved hit over the so-called expenses scandal of 2009–10 (more accurately, an 
allowances scandal), the public seems to have put the scandal behind it and moved on. 
Aside from the allowances scandal, Parliament’s increased self-assertiveness has 
manifested—and has been noticed—in numerous respects. Philip Cowley’s widely cited 
and influential research on the unruliness of “backbenchers,” in their unprecedented 
willingness to defy the party whips, shows that Governments find it increasingly difficult to 
push aspects of their legislative agenda through the House of Commons.
9
 In the House of 
Lords, the quality of debates on a wide range of matters of public policy has long been 
respected. The 2010–12 session, for example, saw prolonged, expert, and highly effective 
debate in the Lords on the health service, Scotland, constitutional reform, welfare reform, 
legal aid provision, and on many other components of the Government’s policy. Such 
debates were not ends in themselves, but led to numerous—even serial—amendments to, 
and revisions of, Government bills, as is the task of a revising chamber. The Terrorist Asset-
Freezing etc. Act 2010,
10
 the Public Bodies Act 2011,
11
 and the Health and Social Care Act 
2012,
12
 among others, were each markedly improved as a direct result of Lords’ 
amendments. The Welfare Reform Act 2012
13
 and the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
14
 would also have been improved had the Commons 
not insisted on rejecting various Lords’ amendments.  
 
Select committees of both Houses produce an ever-increasing volume of very high-quality 
work, which informs and enriches debates both within and beyond Parliament. Both 
                                            
7 See Adam Tomkins, The Rule of Law in Blair’s Britain, 26 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 255 (2007). 
8 See Jonathan Sumption Q.C., F.A. Mann Lecture, Judicial and Political Decision-Making: The Uncertain Boundary 
(2011). Mr. Sumption (as he was when he delivered this lecture) is now a Justice of the U.K. Supreme Court.  
9 See generally PHILIP COWLEY, THE REBELS: HOW BLAIR MISLAID HIS MAJORITY (2005).  
10 Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act, 2010, c. 38 (U.K.).  
11 Public Bodies Act, 2011, c. 24 (U.K.).  
12 Health and Social Care Act, 2012, c. 7 (U.K.). 
13 Welfare Reform Act, 2012, c. 5 (U.K.). 
14 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, 2012, c. 10 (U.K.). 
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Houses have demonstrated that they can debate rights seriously. The debate in the 
Commons on prisoners’ right to vote was a genuinely impressive affair.
15
 The Lords take 
great care over, for example, counter-terrorism measures to ensure, as best they are able, 
that the appropriate balance is struck between the interests of security and those of 
individual liberty and due process.
16
 Both Houses of Parliament routinely show that they 
take the constitution seriously and that they take their onerous constitutional 
responsibilities seriously. Whether it be the Welsh Affairs Committee alerting an Anglo-
centric Westminster to the stark consequences for Wales of the Government’s program of 
constitutional change;
17
 the European Scrutiny Committee assembling a penetrating, 
expert commentary on the constitutional consequences of the so-called “sovereignty 
clause” of the European Union Bill;
18
 the Joint Committee on Human Rights showing the 
over-reach of several of the Government’s proposals in its Justice and Security Green 
Paper;
19
 or countless other examples, the routine, everyday, and frequently superb work of 
our Parliament shows that the political element of the constitution is alive and well. 
Indeed, it is thriving as it rarely has before.  
 
The judges, meanwhile, seem to have settled down somewhat from the heady over-
excitement of Sir John Laws’ “higher-order law”
20
 and from the zest in Jackson with which 
certain of their Lordships seemed to bang nails into the imaginary coffin of parliamentary 
sovereignty.
21
 Legislation is accorded respect, even when it entails the making of difficult 
choices on questions affecting fundamental rights.
22
 The legislation of even devolved, or 
subordinate, legislatures is ruled not to be amenable to judicial review on grounds of 
reasonableness, again because of the constitutionally appropriate respect courts show to 
                                            
15 See 10 February 2011, 523 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2011) 493–586 (U.K.).  
16 See, e.g., the following debates in the House of Lords on the Justice and Security Bill: 19 June 2012, PARL. DEB., 
H.L. (5th ser.) (2012) 1659–95 (U.K.); 11 July 2012, PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2012) 1162–83 (U.K.); 17 July 2012, 
PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2012) 120–44 (U.K.); 21 Nov. 2012, PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2012) 1811–47 (U.K.).  
17 See HOUSE OF COMMONS WELSH AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR WALES OF THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, 2010–12, H.C. 495 (U.K.).  
18 See HOUSE OF COMMONS EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, THE EU BILL AND PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY, 2010–12, H.C. 
633 (U.K.).  
19 See JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN PAPER, 2010–12, H.L. 286, H.C. 1777 (U.K.). 
The Justice and Security Act 2013 is considerably more restrained than were the Government’s original proposals.  
20 Sir John Laws, Law and Democracy, 1995 PUB. L. 72.  
21 R (Jackson) v. AG, [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 A.C. 262.  
22 See, e.g., R (Animal Defenders Int’l) v. Sec’y of State for Culture, Media & Sport, *2008+ UKHL 15, *2008+ A.C. 
1312 (H.L.) *81+ (“Parliament in the context of the overall scheme of the 2003 Act for control of the content and 
nature of political broadcasting, acted within the ambit of the discretionary judgment available to it in introducing 
and maintaining the prohibition on political advertising …”).  
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the superior judgment of “elected members,” who are “best placed to judge what is in the 
country’s best interests as a whole.”
23
 Potentially dangerous and destabilizing dicta from 
2002 about “constitutional statutes”
 24
 having a different status in our legal system have 
been clarified and narrowed.
25
 Few declarations of incompatibility with Convention rights
26
 
have been granted by the appeal courts in recent years, and the courts’ powers to re-
interpret legislation so as to stretch its meaning to conform to their constructions of 
Convention rights
27
 have not been aggressively or widely used. In that most contested 
arena of national security and counter-terrorism law the UK’s appeal courts, far from 
insisting that the Government does more to safeguard individual rights, have tended to be 
too timid rather than too bold, as repeated recent reversals in Strasbourg testify.
28
 The 
major counter-terrorism cases lost by the Government in the UK Supreme Court are cases 
in which the judges have sought to bolster the political constitution, not to undermine it. 
Thus, in Ahmed v. HM Treasury the court ruled that ministers could not rely on order-
making powers to authorize the freezing of terrorist assets, but required clear 
parliamentary authority.
29
 In Al Rawi v. Security Service the court ruled that there was no 
inherent power in the courts to order that a civil action for damages—or part of such an 
action—be conducted under a “closed material procedure.”
30
 If such a development were 
deemed necessary, it would have to be for Parliament to legislate it.
31
  
 
                                            
23 AXA Gen. Ins. v. Lord Advocate, [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 A.C. 868 [49]. Such deference will apply to questions 
of legislative reasonableness, but subordinate Parliaments must of course act strictly within the limits of their 
legal powers, which is quite rightly a question of law, not a question of political judgment. See Imperial Tobacco v. 
Lord Advocate, [2012] UKSC 61, 2013 S.C. (UKSC) 153.   
24 Robinson v. Sec’y of State for N. Ir., [2002] UKHL 32.   
25  See Imperial Tobacco v. Lord Advocate, [2012] UKSC 61, 2013 S.C. (UKSC) 153.  
26 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4 (U.K.). In this essay, the term “Convention rights” means those rights of the 
European Convention on Human Rights given domestic legal force in the UK by the Human Rights Act 1998. 
27 Id. at § 3. 
28 Compare RB (Algeria) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, *2009] UKHL 10, [2010] 2 A.C. 110, with Othman 
(Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, ECHR App. No. 8139/09, 55 EUR. CT. H.R. 1 (2012). Compare R (Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y 
of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] A.C. 332, with Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, ECHR App. Nos. 26766/05 
& 22228/06 53 EUR. CT. H.R. 23 (2011).  Compare R (Al-Skeini) v. Sec’y of State for Defence, *2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 
1 A.C. 153, with Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, ECHR App. No. 55721/07, 53 EUR. CT. H.R. 18 (2011). Compare R 
(Gillan) v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis, *2006] UKHL 12, [2006] 2 A.C. 307, with Gillan v. United Kingdom, 
ECHR App. No. 4158/05, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. 45 (2010).  
29 HM Treasury v. Ahmed, [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2 A.C. 534. See Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act, 2010, c. 38 (U.K.) 
(establishing provisions for imposing financial restrictions on “certain persons believed or suspected to be 
. . . involved in terrorist activities”).  
30 Al Rawi v. Sec. Serv., [2011] UKSC 34, [2012] 1 A.C. 531.   
31 See Justice and Security Act, 2013, c. 18 (U.K.).  
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This is not a manifesto for complacency. It is no part of my argument to suggest that 
Parliament is perfect and in no need of reform or improvement. Nor is it any part of my 
argument to contend that the courts have put themselves firmly back in their place and 
will never again seek to over-reach. We must always be alert to the twin constitutional 
dangers of parliamentary under-performance and judicial power-grabbing. There is, and 
can be, no guarantee that Parliament will not slip back into neglect or that the courts will 
not rediscover the urge to impose, or at least to threaten to impose, upon the people, 
governance by judges.  
 
B. The Constitutional Role of the Courts 
 
It is a well-known feature of the literature that political constitutionalists have been 
quicker to criticize the courts for over-reach—and, at the same time, to criticize them for 
insufficiently protecting civil liberties—than they have been to explain what, positively, 
they think the courts should be doing in constitutional law. Likewise, legal 
constitutionalists have written much more about what they think courts should do than 
where they think the proper limits of judicial power should lie. Many legal 
constitutionalists have written about constitutional law and practice without analyzing 
Parliament’s role at all. In an essay published in the 2010 University of Toronto Law 
Journal, I attempted a first, tentative sketch of what I called “the role of the courts in the 
political constitution.”
32
 On the basis that the courts should do what they are good at—and 
what they are designed for—while leaving to Parliament and others what political 
institutions are good at—and designed for—I made the following main claims: 
 
(i) The courts should ensure that the government acts within the scope of, and not 
beyond, its legal powers;
33
 
(ii) The courts should ensure that the government’s decision-making is procedurally 
fair;
34
 
(iii) The protection of civil liberties should be privileged, so that the courts should 
ensure that government interference with civil liberties may occur only when 
justified as being necessary on the basis of evidence;
35
 
                                            
32 Adam Tomkins, The Role of the Courts in the Political Constitution, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (2010). 
33 I cited the decisions of the House of Lords in the following cases as examples of when I think the courts should 
have gone further in this regard: RB (Algeria) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, *2009] UKHL 10, [2010] 2 A.C. 
110; Austin v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis, *2009+ UKHL 9, *2009+ 1 A.C. 564; R (Bancoult) v. Sec’y of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] UKHL 61, [2009] A.C. 453; R (Corner House) v. Dir. of the Serious 
Fraud Office, [2008] UKHL 60, [2009] 1 A.C. 756; R (Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Defence, *2007+ UKHL 58, *2008+ 
A.C. 332; R (Gillan) v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis, *2006+ UKHL 12, [2006] 2 A.C. 307. In three of these 
cases the verdict of the House of Lords has now been overturned in Strasbourg: Gillan, Al Jedda, and RB (Algeria). 
As indicated above, I welcome the more recent decisions of the UK Supreme Court in Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2 and 
Al Rawi [2011] UKSC 34, as applications of the principle that I was seeking to outline.  
34 Tomkins, supra note 32, at 6.  
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(iv) Some protections of civil liberties are so important that they may be articulated in 
the form of absolute rights—such as the rule that no-one may be subjected to 
torture; such rights should be rigorously enforced by the courts;
36
 and 
(v) The courts should have a role in nourishing and supporting the political 
constitution; when the government acts in a manner that undercuts or 
circumvents effective parliamentary scrutiny, the court should refer the matter 
back to Parliament for reconsideration of the matter.
37
 
 
I also argued (vi) that where the protection of civil liberties was qualified rather than 
absolute, the task of balancing the needs of the public interest against the civil liberty in 
question was appropriately seen as a political question for Parliament rather than as a 
legal question for the courts. As a result, I was critical of the view that the sort of 
proportionality analysis we see in disputes over privacy, freedom of religion, freedom of 
expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, and so forth, should necessarily be a matter for 
the courts.
38
  
 
The role of the courts sketched out in this essay has been the subject of sustained critique 
from Paul Craig.
39
 Professor Craig marshaled a long series of arguments against me, 
including: that I had not admitted to the full consequences of my position; that what I have 
summarized in bullet point (i) above was radically under-determined; and that my position 
was, in a variety of ways, both inconsistent and incoherent. There is a lot to be said about 
                                                                                                                
35 I examined the decision of the House of Lords in R (Gillan) v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis, *2006] UKHL 
12, [2006] 2 A.C. 307 as a leading example of the courts’ failure to undertake this task responsibly. That decision 
was subsequently overturned in Strasbourg, albeit on different grounds. The result is that Parliament changed the 
law. See the provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, repealing and replacing with fresh—and more 
narrowly defined—powers the stop-and-search provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000: Protection of Freedoms Act, 
2012, c. 9 (U.K). It is to be noted that the political constitution got to the right result here both more quickly and 
more convincingly than the courts ever did—Strasbourg included.  
36 Tomkins, supra note 32, at 7. 
37 I cited R (Bancoult) v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *2008+ UKHL 61, *2009+ A.C. 453 as 
an example of where the courts failed to do this—as Lord Mance argued in his compelling dissent in that case. 
Again, HM Treasury v. Ahmed, [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2 A.C. 534 and Al Rawi v. Sec. Serv., [2011] UKSC 34, [2012] 1 
A.C. 531 are more recent examples of where the Supreme Court performed this task well. 
38 I cited R (Begum) v. Denbigh High Sch., [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] A.C. 100, Belfast City Council v. Miss Behavin’ 
Ltd., [2007] UKHL 19, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 1420, and R (Animal Defenders Int’l) v. Sec’y of State for Culture, Media & 
Sport, [2008] UKHL 15, [2008] A.C. 1312. I made clear that my gripe was not that the House of Lords got the 
proportionality assessment wrong in these cases, but that the proportionality assessment was deemed to be a 
task suitable for judicial assessment at all. Tomkins, supra note 32, at 7. 
39 Paul Craig, Political Constitutionalism and the Role of the Courts: A Response, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 112 (2011). 
Professor Craig’s response draws on and develops his earlier critique of my work. Paul Craig, Political 
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, in EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CORNERSTONE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 19, 19–42 
(Christopher Forsyth et al. eds., 2010). 
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each of these arguments, but I shall resist the temptation to launch into a point-by-point 
response to Professor Craig, save to say the following. Professor Craig thinks that it is the 
necessary consequence of my argument that the UK should repeal the Human Rights Act 
1998
40
 (HRA) and withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
41
 I 
disagree. Further, I consider that either course of action would be both disastrous and, 
from the perspective of someone sympathetic to political constitutionalism, extremely 
foolish—at least if the HRA were to be repealed without being replaced by an improved bill 
of rights. While the HRA has undoubtedly empowered the judiciary, and while it has 
undoubtedly done so in ways that pose serious challenges for political constitutionalism,
42
 
repealing it now without replacing it would do nothing to curtail judicial power. Indeed, it 
would surely have the reverse effect. It would lead the judges to fall back on the 
potentially more invasive techniques and mantras of radical common law 
constitutionalism. It would be a move towards the “higher-order law”
43
 of Sir John Laws, 
and others. While the HRA has empowered the judiciary, it has done so in a manner that is 
more respectful of Parliament than not. Other indirect, institutional consequences of the 
HRA—such as the establishment of the Joint Committee on Human Rights—which have 
worked to strengthen the political constitution, would be placed in jeopardy were the HRA 
to be repealed without being replaced.  
 
Professor Craig thinks that my argument that proportionality is a political question for 
political institutions rather than a question of law for the courts is straightforwardly 
incompatible with the HRA and the ECHR. It is not. The next section of this essay seeks, 
among other things, to explain why. Professor Craig arrives at this position because he fires 
at an imaginary target: His aim is focused on what he thinks I must mean, not on what I 
have actually said. He writes, for example, that “for Tomkins the courts should not enforce 
most of the rights contained in the ECHR.”
44
 This is an inaccurate summary of the position I 
set out in The Role of the Courts.
45
 With regard to what are, in Convention terms, “qualified 
rights”—such as privacy and expression—I consider that the courts should be anxious to 
ensure that any government interference with these civil liberties is strictly in accordance 
with law and is justified on the evidence as being necessary—see bullet points (i) and (iii) 
above. All of this is plain from what I wrote in The Role of the Courts about judicial review, 
                                            
40 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.). 
41 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
42 Serious challenges, but not insurmountable ones, and certainly not fatal ones. See further below.  
43 See Laws, supra note 20. 
44 Craig, supra note 39, at 118. 
45 Tomkins, supra note 32. 
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powers, and evidence.
46
 Expressing doubt that a proportionality analysis is always an 
appropriate task for a court of law is not remotely the same as saying that the courts 
should not protect these civil liberties at all.
47
 I develop this point below.  
 
C. Necessity, Balancing, and Proportionality 
 
I stand by the arguments summarized in the five bullet points (i)–(v) listed above. The 
argument (vi), about proportionality review in the context of what in the European 
Convention are “qualified rights,” however, is in need of refinement. The question to be 
addressed is: How may the judicial enforcement of “qualified rights” be rendered 
compatible with political constitutionalism? If we have a mixed constitution that includes 
some element of judicial enforcement of qualified rights, is that constitution, in reality, not 
a mixed constitution, but a fully legal constitution? In what follows, I will suggest that, 
when carefully defined, some elements of the judicial enforcement of qualified rights are 
compatible with political constitutionalism and that to embrace this position does not 
mean that we have to abandon the political constitution.  
 
As is well known, qualified rights in the ECHR—such as those of privacy and freedom of 
expression, etc.—are qualified in three ways. Public interference with the rights will be 
lawful if the interference is (1) prescribed by law, (2) necessary in a democratic society, and 
(3) in order to protect a certain, listed, public interest—such as national security. It is self-
evident that some aspects of these qualifications are legal in character and that, as such, 
they raise questions of law appropriate for judicial determination. The first test—whether 
an interference with the right in question is prescribed by law—is a matter of legal 
interpretation. Does the government have the power to act in this manner or not? There is 
no objection from political constitutionalism to courts having the power to rule 
authoritatively on this question.
48
  
 
The third test may likewise raise questions that are appropriate for judicial determination: 
If the evidence shows that an interference with freedom of expression has in fact been 
made for an illegitimate purpose—i.e., a purpose that is not listed in the relevant article of 
the ECHR—then a court should have little difficulty in ruling that the interference is 
                                            
46 Id. 
47 Further, just because the European Court of Human Rights ruled in Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, ECHR 
App. Nos. 33985/96 & 33986/96, 29 EUR. CT. H.R. 493 (1999), that the Court of Appeal’s use of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness in R v. Sec’y of State for Defence, ex p. Smith, *1995+ EWCA (Civ) 22, *1996+ Q.B. 517 was 
insufficient to meet the requirements of the right to an effective remedy in Article 13 ECHR does not mean to say 
that courts in the UK are now required in all circumstances to engage in full proportionality analysis. There are 
any number of ways in which the Court’s ruling in Smith & Grady could be accommodated, confined, or 
distinguished.  
48 See ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 20 (2005). 
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unlawful. If legislation confers powers on a minister providing that they are to be exercised 
in order to further certain, prescribed purposes, and if a minister subsequently seeks to 
exercise those powers to further purposes not contemplated in the legislation, that 
minister may be acting unlawfully and, if it comes before them, the courts should rule on 
the matter.
49
 The same applies in the context of the ECHR. The lists of legitimate ends, in 
whose name rights may be qualified, are closed. There is a particular list for each right. 
Checking the evidence to ensure that any particular interference has in fact been made in 
order to serve one of the purposes listed in the article in question ought to be a 
straightforward matter for legal determination. There is nothing incompatible with political 
constitutionalism in courts’ ruling on this question. It is not that the courts are creating for 
themselves lists of ends in whose service rights may be qualified; the lists are prescribed in 
the Convention and all that the court needs to do is to check the particular interference 
against the relevant list.  
 
In practice, however, few cases turn on this issue. Some cases turn on the question of 
whether the government truly has the legal power to interfere with the right (i.e., the first 
test: Is it prescribed by law).
50
 But the overwhelming majority of cases concerned with 
qualified rights turn on the second test: Is the interference “necessary in a democratic 
society”? As we all know, the European Court of Human Rights has long since ruled that 
this is to be treated as a test of proportionality.
51
 This is where the problem lies: What is it 
that makes the proportionality assessment a legal task for the courts rather than a political 
choice for the government and Parliament?  
 
This question is not meant to cast doubt on the value of proportionality. If our privacy, our 
freedom of expression, or our right to protest have to be limited, it is far better that they 
should be limited proportionately than disproportionately. Likewise reasonableness (or 
rationality).
52
 It is far better that government decisions are reasonable than unreasonable 
and it is far better that the government’s powers are exercised rationally than irrationally. 
So, let us describe the qualities of reasonableness, rationality, and proportionality as a 
cluster of constitutional goods. Why are they constitutional goods? We can argue that they 
are constitutional goods from a number of perspectives: Because rational (or reasonable, 
or proportionate) decision-making is better decision-making; because it is a component of 
                                            
49 More difficult is the case where the statute confers powers on the minister leaving their scope or proper 
purpose unclear. I suggested in The Role of the Courts that in such cases the courts should refer the matter back 
to Parliament for the legislature to clarify what it meant. Tomkins, supra note 32, at 20–21. For an instance where 
this could have been valuable, see R v. Sec’y of State for Health, ex p. Keen, *1990+ COD 371, (1990) 3 Admin LR 
180.  
50 Gillan v. United Kingdom, ECHR App. No. 4158/05, para. 45, 2010 EUR. CT. H.R. 28. 
51 Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, ECHR App. Nos. 33985/96 & 33986/96, para. 87, 1999 EUR. CT. H.R. 493. 
52 I take reasonableness and rationality to be synonymous with one another.  
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good governance; because it is what the governed expect; because it is what Parliament 
expects; and because it is fairer than the alternative. We can similarly argue that it would 
be constitutionally problematic or undesirable for the government to be permitted, or 
freely able, to engage in irrational, unreasonable, or disproportionate action or decision-
making.  
 
At the same time, however, we can readily see that an insistence on rational government is 
not the only constitutional good at stake. At least three other relevant constitutional goods 
may be identified. The first is that the government of the day should be allowed to govern. 
Constitutions around the world recognize that a core component of the state’s power is 
executive in character. This executive power is vested, in large measure, in the 
government.
53
 It is right that executive power is exercised by the government. Subjecting 
the government to review in the courts should not collapse into allowing the judges to 
govern in place of the government. This is a fine line to draw, as any student of 
administrative law understands. But, there is a line: A line that respects the constitutional 
good of recognizing that it is for the government to govern.  
 
From this, we see immediately a third constitutional good, accountability. Yes, it is for the 
government to govern but, equally, it is a constitutional good that the government of the 
day is held (or, at least, is liable to be held) fully to account for the exercise of its powers. 
In a parliamentary democracy such as the UK this means, principally, accountability to 
Parliament. Ministers are rightly accountable to Parliament for their, and their 
departments’, actions, policies, and decisions.
54
 Finally, we should recognize as a 
constitutional good the fact that the government is chosen by force of democracy. While in 
a parliamentary democracy we do not elect our government as such, we do elect the 
House of Commons from which the government of the day emerges and to which the 
government is subsequently held to account. No government may survive in office unless it 
commands the support of the Commons, and any government that loses the confidence of 
the House must resign.
55
 Thus, governments enjoy power because of the success of their 
political programs. These programs will have received the endorsement of the electorate, 
given the electorate’s collective decision to elect to Parliament a majority of Members who 
will support, rather than oppose, the government of the day. That the government has a 
democratic mandate in this manner is, for present purposes, our final constitutional good. 
  
Judicial review of the exercise of government powers should operate in the light of this 
range of constitutional goods. This is the task of constitutional judgment: To know, in any 
                                            
53 Some of the power is exercised by office-holders independent or semi-independent of government, such as the 
police or regulatory agencies; in the UK this is a matter for Parliament to determine in legislation. 
54 COLIN TURPIN & ADAM TOMKINS, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 566–660 (7th ed. 2011).  
55 See Fixed-term Parliaments Act, 2011, c. 14, § 2(3) (U.K.).  
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particular case, what weight to attach to each good. Let us return for a moment to bullet 
point (i) above: Courts should ensure that the government acts within the scope of, and 
not beyond, the government’s legal powers. Vigorous exercise of this power is justified 
because our other constitutional goods should be subject to it. The government should be 
permitted to govern within the limits of its legal powers. The government has a democratic 
mandate to govern, but no democratic mandate can authorize the government to act 
unlawfully. The government is ordinarily and routinely accountable to Parliament, but 
Parliament’s main concern will be to assess the government’s performance politically, not 
to ensure that it has exercised its powers according to law. Thus, our other constitutional 
goods are not inappropriately compromised by the courts’ rigorously ensuring that the 
government acts within its legal powers. Indeed, robust judicial review on this ground may 
strengthen and help to nurture the political constitution. Suppose that a court rules that a 
certain government action is unlawful because the government lacks the legal power to act 
in that particular way. What will the government do? In all likelihood it will turn to 
Parliament, seeking legislation that will provide for the powers which the court has 
identified it to lack. Parliament will then have the opportunity to debate what the extent of 
the powers should be, and it will have the chance to restrict those powers or to append to 
them whatever procedural or substantive safeguards it considers to be appropriate.
56
 
  
Now, contrast this with judicial review on grounds of reasonableness or proportionality. 
Inherent within the constitutional idea that the government should be permitted to govern 
is the idea that the government is entitled to exercise discretion. A challenge on grounds of 
reasonableness or proportionality is a challenge of discretion and not a challenge to 
powers. The argument is not that the government is seeking to exercise a power that it 
does not have. Rather, the argument is that the government is exercising a power that it 
does have but in a manner that goes too far. A challenge on grounds of reasonableness or 
proportionality cuts more deeply into the constitutional good of allowing the government 
to govern than does review on grounds of lack of legal powers. The electorate also has an 
interest in what is reasonable or proportionate for the government to do. While the 
electorate cannot confer on the government the power to act beyond the limits of its legal 
powers, the electorate surely can mandate the government to exercise its legal powers in a 
particular way. For example, the government has legal powers to cut public expenditure. A 
party may propose in an election campaign to exercise such powers drastically, in order to 
address what it perceives to be an excessive public debt or an excessive degree of public 
overspending. What if that party wins the election and forms the next government, and 
others subsequently consider that aspects of the spending cuts are unreasonable or 
disproportionate? The fact that the government has an electoral mandate to cut public 
spending is at least a factor to be weighed in any determination of whether the cuts really 
                                            
56 Two recent examples are cited above: HM Treasury v. Ahmed leading to the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act 
2010 and Al Rawi v. Security Service leading to the Justice and Security Act 2013. See supra notes 29–31 and 
accompanying text. 
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are reasonable or unreasonable, proportionate or disproportionate. In other words, the 
constitutional good of the government having a democratic mandate has, in this instance, 
to be accorded some weight. As does the constitutional good of accountability to 
Parliament. This is just the sort of disagreement in which we would expect robust 
parliamentary debate and detailed parliamentary scrutiny of the government’s decision-
making. The reasonableness or proportionality of government policy and decision-making 
is, in fact, the mainstay of parliamentary debate. This is as true for the high theatre of 
Prime Minister’s Question Time as it is for legislative debates on government bills and the 
examination of government witnesses before select committees.  
 
There is the possibility, therefore, that judicial review on grounds of reasonableness or 
proportionality may undercut any (or all) of the other values that we have identified as 
constitutional goods. This does not mean that judicial review on these grounds should 
never be countenanced. But when it is contemplated, it should be considered alongside 
our other constitutional goods and in their light. When it comes to review on grounds of 
reasonableness or proportionality, we need a judicial review that is appropriately 
responsive to, and respectful of, these other constitutional goods and accords them due 
weight. A reasonable and proportionate government is itself a constitutional good, but 
judicial review that over-invests in this one constitutional good at the expense of the 
others would make for an unbalanced constitutional order. Likewise, over-investment in 
any of the other constitutional goods at the expense of securing reasonable and 
proportionate government would be unbalanced. On this view, to say that we should 
never have judicial review on grounds of reasonableness or proportionality because it may 
sometimes undercut the value of other constitutional goods is going too far too fast. 
Likewise, saying that judicial review should always be available on these grounds, even at 
the expense of undercutting the value of other constitutional goods, is itself a 
disproportionate approach to constitutionalism. A balanced mix of these various 
constitutional goods is preferable, and a successful mix is one that achieves such a 
balance.
57
 I do not pretend that this is easy, but it is the goal towards which I think we 
should work. This is what I meant, at the beginning of this essay, when I suggested that, 
instead of arguing about whether we have a political or a legal constitution, it would be 
better to argue about how we can most appropriately mix the political and legal elements 
of the constitution together to generate a constitutional order that is balanced and 
stable.
58
  
                                            
57 One area of public law in the United Kingdom which is currently imbalanced—or where the current balance is 
plainly wrong—is that of prisoners’ right to vote. The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Hirst v. 
United Kingdom (No 2), ECHR App. No. 74025/01, 2005 EUR. CT. H.R. 681 is a perfect case-study of how not to rule 
on proportionality, as Strasbourg implicitly recognized when it modified Hirst in Scoppola v. Italy (No 3), ECHR 
App. No. 126/05, 2012 EUR. CT. H.R. 868. 
58 Just a note on stability: To suggest that the attainment of a reasonable degree of constitutional stability is a 
worthy goal does not mean to say that we should not continue to facilitate and, indeed, encourage argument, 
contestation, and debate about further constitutional reform. Stability is not the same as rigidity. One can be in 
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All constitutional actors have a shared responsibility to seek to achieve this balance. The 
specific responsibility of the courts is to check whether, in a case in which government 
action or decision-making is challenged on grounds of reasonableness or proportionality, a 
ruling on this matter would undermine the other constitutional goods we have identified. 
If the government’s decision or action is supported by a clear democratic mandate and it 
can be shown that there has been effective parliamentary scrutiny, the courts should 
pause before ruling on the matter to ensure that they would not be jeopardizing these 
constitutional goods. But if the government’s decision or action lacks a clear democratic 
mandate and there is no realistic prospect of effective parliamentary scrutiny, then it may 
well be that the courts can rule on the matter without jeopardizing other constitutional 
goods.  
 
One consequence of this approach is that we would be likely to see stronger judicial review 
of government action when the decision-maker is further removed from Parliament. We 
might see less judicial review of the reasonableness or proportionality of ministerial 
decision-making because ministers have the clearest democratic mandate and are subject 
to the most effective parliamentary scrutiny. But if the defendant in a claim for judicial 
review is a chief constable, a member of a health board, an independent regulator, or a 
non-departmental public body, the likelihood of robust judicial review undermining our 
other constitutional goods is reduced. Depending on the context, and on the judicial 
assessment of their mandate and their political accountability, judicial review of local 
authorities on grounds of proportionality or reasonableness might fall somewhere in 
between. It is a core component of political constitutionalism that political decisions 
should be taken by political actors. Not all government decisions, however, are political, 
and many government decisions are made by officials, bureaucrats, police officers, or 
other non-political public office-holders.  
 
Judicial assessment of other constitutional goods would require courts to be cognizant of, 
and sensitive to, a number of political considerations that some judges currently feel are 
beyond their appropriate scope. The argument presented here is not that the courts 
should be ruling on whether the government has a sufficient democratic mandate for its 
actions, or whether parliamentary scrutiny is sufficiently effective, but that the courts 
should be taking these matters into account when determining the extent to which it is 
appropriate for them to scrutinize government against standards of reasonableness or 
proportionality. This is not a revolutionary step. Courts in the UK already do this, for 
example, in cases where legislation is challenged for violating Convention rights. The 
decisions of the House of Lords in Alconbury
59
 and Animal Defenders International,
60
 and of 
                                                                                                                
favor of constitutional stability without having to advocate that the constitution should be put beyond politics, or 
should be somehow fixed or frozen.  
59 R v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, Transp. & the Regions, *2001+ UKHL 23, *2003+ 2 A.C. 295. 
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the Supreme Court in AXA General Insurance,
61
 are good illustrations. A law of judicial 
review modeled on these grounds would be likely to nurture the model of parliamentary 
accountability beloved of political constitutionalists, not to rival it.  
 
D. Conclusions 
 
So, what is left of the political constitution? Plenty remains. First, there is nothing in our 
constitutional order that is established as being beyond the reach of Parliament. 
Parliamentary sovereignty continues. Some judges have hinted of ways in which the courts 
may in the future begin to curtail parliamentary sovereignty, but to date these are only 
obiter remarks: No case has yet been decided on such a basis.
62
 Other judges have 
suggested forcefully that even though they were only obiter, such remarks were 
misplaced.
63
 Of course, the United Kingdom has committed to certain European and 
international obligations, and Parliament’s legislation is subject to those constraints. Both 
the courts and Parliament have made it clear that this is because Parliament wills it to be 
so, not because some extra-parliamentary force has imposed its will on Parliament.
64
 
When an authority higher than Parliament is needed to make a change, that higher 
authority is the electorate. If a matter is deemed to be inappropriate for Parliament to 
determine, then the alternative forum is the referendum. We do not give up on the 
processes of politics and ask the Supreme Court to act instead. We ask the people directly. 
Indeed, even when governments within the United Kingdom strongly disagree with one 
another over a constitutional matter, they endeavor to keep their disagreements within 
the domain of politics and try to avoid turning the matter over to the courts for a ruling. 
The debate in 2012 about the legal authority required for a referendum on Scottish 
independence is a prime example. Dozens of contributions were made to the debate; none 
argued that the ideal solution would be to have the Supreme Court decide it.
65
  
 
It is beyond serious debate that the powers of the courts in the UK’s public law have grown 
enormously in the last twenty years, but there is little evidence that these powers—or 
                                                                                                                
60 R (Animal Defenders Int’l) v. Sec’y of State for Culture, Media & Sport, *2008+ UKHL 15, *2008+ A.C. 1312. 
61 AXA Gen. Ins. v. Lord Advocate, [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 A.C. 868.  
62 See R (Jackson) v. AG, [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 A.C. 262, paras. 102, 107, 159.  
63 TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 162 (2010); Lord Neuberger M.R., Lord Alexander of Weedon Lecture: Who are 
the Masters Now? para. 42 (Apr. 6, 2011).  
64 Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, [2002] EWHC 195, para. 65; European Union Act, 2011, c. 12, § 18 (U.K.).  
65 After ten months of wrangling, the UK and Scottish Governments came to an agreement about the matter in 
October 2012. HOUSE OF LORDS CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE, THE AGREEMENT ON A REFERENDUM ON INDEPENDENCE FOR 
SCOTLAND, 2012–13, H.L. 62 (U.K.). The Agreement meant that the legality of the Scottish independence 
referendum was settled without the need for litigation.  
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their exercise—have supplanted the old political constitution with a new legal one. I once 
feared that this would occur. Looking back at some of the more extreme expressions of 
legal constitutionalism, it may have been a well-founded fear. Wiser heads, however, have 
prevailed. The new powers of our courts, whether under the Human Rights Act, the 
devolution legislation, or otherwise, have generally been exercised in a manner that seeks 
to supplement the political constitution, not to undermine it. Ours is no longer an entirely 
political constitution—the model of the political constitution taken alone no longer makes 
full sense of our contemporary constitutional experience—but the political constitution 
remains vibrant and vital as a core component of our increasingly rich constitutional order. 
 
Political constitutionalists had two main reasons for opposing a turn to legal 
constitutionalism. These reasons were not always altogether compatible with one another. 
The first was that the courts were inherently conservative, and they would use their 
powers to quash or to limit progressive policies or legislation. The threat has not 
materialized. There has been little progressive legislation in recent years (the Equality Act 
2010
66
 may be an exception). The Labour party in government took a decisively 
authoritarian turn; it sought to build on and not to reverse Conservative legislation on civil 
liberties, the Human Rights Act notwithstanding. One of its more progressive 
achievements, the Freedom of Information Act 2000, was identified by Tony Blair as one of 
his greatest mistakes in office.
67
 At the same time, the politics of the judiciary has changed 
since Professor Griffith wrote the first edition of his book in the mid 1970s.
68
 The current 
generation of appeal court judges is far less obviously conservative, in the sense that 
Griffith defined it,
69
 than was the case in the 1970s and 1980s. This is not to say that the 
current judges are radical progressives but in their attitudes on the relationship between 
public law and policy, they do not closely resemble their predecessors.  
 
The political constitutionalists’ second reason for opposing a turn to legal constitutionalism 
was that, in reviewing less progressive and more repressive measures, the courts would 
use their powers to give legitimacy to the government’s otherwise highly contestable 
policies. Griffith argued passionately, for example, that the Official Secrets Act 1989 was an 
irresponsible attack on free speech.
70
 At the time of the passage of that Act, there was 
significant disquiet expressed in Parliament. Yet, in R v. Shayler, the House of Lords upheld 
some of the Act’s most coercive aspects as compatible with Article 10 ECHR.
71
 Such a 
                                            
66 Equality Act, 2010, c. 15 (U.K.). 
67 TONY BLAIR, A JOURNEY 516–17 (2010).  
68 JOHN A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (1977).  
69 JOHN A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 336 (5th ed. 1997).  
70 John A.G. Griffith, The Official Secrets Act 1989, 16 J.L. & SOC’Y 273 (1989).  
71 R v. Shayler, [2002] UKHL 11, [2003] 1 A.C. 247.  
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judgment makes it more difficult to marshal effective parliamentary or political argument 
in favor of reform.
72
 More telling examples are the first judgments on control orders, given 
by the House of Lords in 2007.
73
 These judgments, while critical of a number of features of 
particular control orders, upheld the validity of the overall regime as a proportionate 
response to the threat of international terrorism. Yet, at the same time, Parliament’s Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) was gaining support from across the parties for its 
detailed critiques of the fundamental unfairness of the system.
74
 The Committee 
recognized that its efforts were undercut by the Law Lords. The Government was equally 
quick to highlight the House of Lords’ opinions as evidence that the policy was right. The 
critics were sidelined and control orders were left intact.
75
 They were eventually 
recognized to be disproportionate only after a change of government.
76
 That a 
Conservative Home Secretary, and not the courts, arrived at this conclusion, surely tells us 
something about the competing merits of our politics and of our law in the protection of 
civil liberties.  
 
These examples are important, but they are relatively rare. The law reports are not full, as 
we feared they might be, with cases in which the courts have unquestioningly upheld 
coercive government action. On the contrary, increasingly searching and anxious scrutiny is 
given even in contexts where it was formerly almost entirely absent. National security is a 
prime example. The Belmarsh decision
77
—in which the House of Lords ruled that the UK 
Government’s scheme of indefinite detention without trial for suspected international 
terrorists was incompatible with Convention rights—was a real shock after the litany of 
cases in which the appeal courts had ruled that decision-making in the arena of national 
security was a matter for the executive and not for the judiciary.
78
 Even when the 
government wins in national security litigation, its claims are analyzed and assessed rather 
than merely accepted without demur. And Belmarsh, of course, is far from the only 
national security case that the government has lost, albeit that in recent years it has been 
                                            
72 It must be said, however, that once the Labour Government assumed office in 1997, it gave no indication that it 
thought that official secrets legislation needed to be liberalized. 
73 Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] 1 A.C.; Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. MB, 
[2007] UKHL 46, [2008] A.C. 440; Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. E, *2007+ UKHL 47, [2008] 1 A.C. 499. 
74 Adam Tomkins, Parliament, Human Rights, and Counter-Terrorism, in THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
SCEPTICAL ESSAYS 13, 34–49 (Tom Campbell, K.D. Ewing & Adam Tomkins eds., 2010). 
75 Id.  
76 See Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act, 2011, c. 23 (U.K.). 
77 A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68. 
78 See, e.g., Liversidge v. Anderson, *1942+ A.C. 206 (H.L.); R v. Sec’y of State for Home Affairs ex parte Hosenball, 
*1977+ 1 W.L.R. 766 (Eng.); R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t ex parte Cheblak, [1991] 1 W.L.R. 890 (Eng.).  
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first-instance judges, and not the appeal courts, that have been more likely to find against 
the government.
79
 
 
To the political constitutionalists’ critics, it sometimes appeared that these reasons for 
skepticism about judicial power meant that the courts were “damned if they did and 
damned if they didn’t.” If a court failed to intervene to quash illiberal government action it 
would be criticized for not protecting civil liberties, but if a court did intervene, it would be 
criticized for trespassing into politics. What I have tried to do in this essay, by building on, 
and in one respect amending my first, incomplete attempt in 2010, is to set out a vision of 
the constitutional role for the judiciary that avoids this trap. I want a judiciary that protects 
civil liberties by ensuring, among other matters, that when the government acts to infringe 
our liberties it does so only because Parliament has clearly authorized it. At the same time, 
I want a judiciary that leaves political decisions to political actors. By creating a law of 
judicial review that focuses on powers and that scrutinizes intensely the evidential basis 
that supports government interference with civil liberties, and by creating a law of judicial 
review that accommodates tests of reasonableness and proportionality in a manner that 
respects the political constitution, I think that both ambitions can be fulfilled at the same 
time.  
 
I have argued that the political and the legal of the constitution can and should be mixed. I 
do not want to go back to the political constitution. The mixed constitution is better as 
long as it continues to value and to invest in the constitutional goods that the political 
model of constitutionalism has rightly taught us to cherish. 
                                            
79 See Adam Tomkins, National Security and the Role of the Court: A Changed Landscape?, 126 LAW Q. REV. 543 
(2010).  
